

Chapter 4

The Augustinian Dimension: Narratives of Succession and Secession

E perché meno ammiri la parola,
guarda il calor del sol che si fa vino,
giunto a l'omor che de la vita cola.

(*Purg.* XXV.76-78)¹

1. Introduction: patterns of affirmation and emancipation. 2. Aquinas, Augustine, and the tyranny of the *Sed contra*. 3. Augustinian and non-Augustinian itineraries in Dante: patterns of sameness (the psychology and pathology of dissimilitude) and patterns of otherness (nature, grace and the viability of the human project). 4. Conclusion: Dantean Augustinianism: continuity and discontinuity in the depths.

Never far beneath the surface both of Thomist and of Dantean spirituality is the figure of Augustine, massively present to the Aquinas of the grace questions of the *Summa theologiae*, but everywhere discernible too in both the macro- and the micro-structures of the *Commedia*. As far as Aquinas is concerned, or at least the Aquinas of the grace treatise of the *Prima secundae*, there is no need to labour the point. Simply to turn the pages of the text is to be impressed by the omnipresence of Augustine, alongside Scripture, as the decisive voice;² so, for example, this from 109.4: 'Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de haeresibus, hoc pertinere ad haeresim Pelagianorum, ut credant "sine gratia posse hominem facere omnia divina mandata";³ or this from 109.8: 'Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Perfect. Iustit., "quisquis negat nos orare debere ne intremus in

¹ And that you may marvel less at my words, look at the sun's heat which is made wine when combined with the juice that flows from the vine.

² J. G. Geenen, 'Le fonti patristiche come "autorità" nella teologia di san Tommaso', *Sacra Doctrina* 77 (1975), 7-67; L. J. Elders, 'Les citations de saint Augustin dans la Somme Théologique de saint Thomas d'Aquin', *Doctor Communis* (1987), 40, 115-67.

³ Augustine, by contrast, in his book on heresies [*De haeres.* lxxxviii.2], says that it is part of the Pelagian heresy that they believe that 'without grace man can fulfil all the divine commandments'.

tentationem (negat autem hoc qui contendit ad non peccandum gratiae Dei adiutorium non esse homini necessarium, sed, sola lege accepta, humanam sufficere voluntatem), ab auribus omnium removendum, et ore omnium anathematizandum esse non dubito”;⁴ or this from 110.3: “Neque etiam caritas, quia gratia praevenit caritatem”, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. sanctorum. Ergo gratia non est virtus.⁵ Throughout, the pattern is the same, Augustine everywhere being on hand both to assist and to insist when it comes to resolving issues in the complex area of grace theology. But with Dante it is different, for indebted as he is to Augustine as a guide to the content of the religious life, his even so is a rethinking of the Augustinian component of his spirituality, a steady commitment, if not to *unlearning*, exactly, everything he had learnt from Augustine in the areas especially of ethics, psychology and soteriology, then to a fresh substantiation and contextualization of the leading idea. Here, then, is a further way of seeing and setting up the question of Dante and Aquinas and of marking the difference between them, Dante’s, for all his rejoicing in the presence of Augustine as a fellow traveller and breaker of bread, being a wish to distance himself from the severer aspects of Augustinian piety in favour of a fresh account of God’s dealings with man and of man’s with God within the salvific economy of the whole.

2. Notable as a feature of the grace questions in the *Prima secundae* are their responsiveness to the sterner aspects of Augustine’s grace theology, to those aspects of it which, though everywhere discernible in the great bishop, were sharpened by his encounter with Pelagius and Pelagianism. The basic question, turning as it does on what Augustine came to regard as a threat to the efficacy and indispensability of God’s salvific work in the Christ, is familiar enough, his misgivings with respect to the place of free will in the area of soteriology constraining him to an ever more insistent sense of the primacy of the divine in respect of the human initiative as the principle in man of his ultimate well-being.⁶ And it was

⁴ Augustine, on the other hand, in his book *On the Perfection of Human Righteousness* [xxi.44], maintains that ‘whoever denies that we ought to say the prayer “Lead us not into temptation” (and they deny it who maintain that the help of God’s grace is not necessary to man for salvation, but that the gift of the law is enough for the human will) ought without doubt to be removed beyond all hearing, and to be anathematized by the tongues of all’.

⁵ Nor is it charity, since as Augustine says in his book on the *Predestination of the Saints* [*De dono perv. xvi*], grace precedes charity. Therefore grace is not virtue.

⁶ J. Ferguson, *Pelagius. A Historical and Theological Study* (Cambridge: W. Heffer, 1956); T. Bohlin, *Die Theologie des Pelagius und ihre Genesis*, trans. from the Swedish by H. Buch (Uppsala: Lundequistska bokhandeln, 1957); S. Prete, *Pelagio e il pelagianesimo* (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1961); R. F. Evans, *Pelagius, Inquiries and Reappraisals* (New York: Seabury

doubtless the presence to Aquinas of the Augustine of the anti-Pelagian period that accounts for his own darkening spirituality in this area, his own deepening sense of the difficulty of man's aspiring to, or indeed even of his wishing to aspire to, a knowledge of God short of the grace whereby such knowledge is a possibility in the first place. Take, for example, the case of *ST Ia IIae.109.2* relative to whether or not a man can do well, or even wish to do well, in the absence of grace ('*Utrum homo possit velle et facere bonum absque gratia*'), where Thomas's answer tends always to be no; for though in his innocence, Aquinas maintains, man was able both to will and actually to do the kind of good proportionate to his nature, needing grace only for the accomplishment of his supernatural end, in his fallenness he can do neither:

in statu naturae integrae, quantum ad sufficientiam operativae virtutis, poterat homo per sua naturalia velle et operari bonum suae naturae proportionatum, quale est bonum virtutis acquisitae, non autem bonum superexcedens, quale est bonum virtutis infusae. Sed in statu naturae corruptae etiam deficit homo ab hoc quod secundum suam naturam potest, ut non possit totum huiusmodi bonum implere per sua naturalia.

(*ST Ia IIae.109.2 resp.*)⁷

Press, 1968); G. Greshake, *Gnade als konkrete Freiheit; eine Untersuchung zur Gnadenlehre des Pelagius* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald-Verlag, 1972); B. R. Rees, *Pelagius. A Reluctant Heretic* (Woodbridge, Suffolk and Wolfeboro, NH: Boydell Press, 1988); idem, *Pelagius. Life and Letters* (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 1998); W. L. Löhr, *Pelagius. Portrait of a Christian Teacher in Late Antiquity* (Aberdeen: School of Divinity, History and Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, 2007). On Augustine and Pelagius, P. Lehmann, 'The Anti-Pelagian Writings', in R. W. Battenhouse (ed.), *A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 203-34; J. A. Mourant and W. J. Collinge (trans.), *Four Anti-Pelagian Writings* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1992). On Augustine and grace, X. Léon-Dufour, 'Grâce et libre arbitre chez saint Augustin. À propos de: *Consentire vocationi Dei... propriae voluntatis est*', *Recherches de Science Religieuse* 33 (1946), 129-63; J. Patout Burns, *The Development of Augustine's Doctrine of Operative Grace* (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1980); C. Harrison, 'Delectatio Victrix: Grace and Freedom in Saint Augustine', *Studia patristica* 27 (1993), 298-302; D. R. Creswell, *St Augustine's Dilemma. Grace and Eternal Law in the Major Works of Augustine of Hippo* (New York: Peter Lang, 1997); B. Studer, *The Grace of Christ and the Grace of God in Augustine of Hippo: Christocentrism or Theocentrism?*, trans. M. J. O'Connell (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1997); D. Ogliari, *Gratia et certamen. The Relationship between Grace and Free Will in the Discussion of Augustine with the so-called Semipelagians* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003). More generally, R. W. Gleason, S.J., *Grace* (London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1962); N. P. Williams, *The Grace of God* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1966; originally 1930).

⁷ in the state of integrity, as regards the sufficiency of the operative power, man by his natural endowments could wish and do the good proportionate to his nature, such

True, even in his fallenness, Aquinas goes on, *some* things can be done without the prior and continuing assistance of grace, for human nature after Eden is not entirely corrupt, entirely incapacitated in respect of its power to do well:

Quia tamen natura humana per peccatum non est totaliter corrupta, ut scilicet toto bono naturae privetur; potest quidem etiam in statu naturae corruptae, per virtutem suae naturae aliquod bonum particulare agere, sicut aedificare domos, plantare vineas, et alia huiusmodi.

(*ibid.*)⁸

But this notwithstanding, the answer still has to be no, and this because, well before Thomas gets into his stride in the body of the article, Augustine, the anti-Pelagian Augustine of the *De correptione et gratia*, has already finessed the argument, insisting from beforehand, from out of the peremptoriness of the *Sed contra*, that ‘without grace men can do nothing good when they either think or wish or love or act’ (‘sine gratia nullum prorsus, sive cogitando, sive volendo et amando, sive agendo, faciunt homines bonum’ [*De corrept. et gratia* ii.3]). That, then, is that, the ‘building houses and planting vineyards’ element of the argument serving in its exiguousness merely to underline the hopelessness of the

as the good of acquired virtue; but no surpassing good, as the good of infused virtue. But in the state of corrupt nature man falls short even of what he can do by his own nature, so that he is unable to fulfil it by his own natural powers. More explicit on the notion of the impossibility of right willing, as distinct from right doing, in the state of disobedience, the *ad primum* of this article: ‘Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo est dominus suorum actuum, et volendi et non volendi, propter deliberationem rationis, quae potest flecti ad unam partem vel ad aliam. Sed quod deliberet vel non deliberet, si huius etiam sit dominus, oportet quod hoc sit per deliberationem praecedentem. Et cum hoc non procedat in infinitum, oportet quod finaliter deveniatur ad hoc quod liberum arbitrium hominis moveatur ab aliquo exteriori principio quod est supra mentem humanam, scilicet a Deo; ut etiam philosophus probat in cap. de bona fortuna. Unde mens hominis etiam sani non ita habet dominium sui actus quin indigeat moveri a Deo. Et multo magis liberum arbitrium hominis infirmi post peccatum, quod impeditur a bono per corruptionem naturae.’

⁸ Yet because man is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every natural good, even in the state of corrupted nature he can, by virtue of his natural endowments, work some particular good, such as building houses, planting vineyards, and the like. *De ver.* 24.14 resp.: ‘Illud autem bonum quod est naturae humanae proportionatum, potest homo per liberum arbitrium explere; unde dicit Augustinus quod homo per liberum arbitrium potest agros colere, domos aedificare, et alia plura bona facere sine gratia operante. Quamvis autem huiusmodi bona homo possit facere sine gratia gratum faciente, non tamen potest ea facere sine Deo; cum nulla res possit in naturalem operationem exire nisi virtute divina, quia causa secunda non agit nisi per virtutem causae primae ...’

situation in which we now find ourselves. And what applies in Article 2 of Ia IIae.109 applies also in Article 4, where it is a question of whether, without grace, man can abide by the law ('Utrum homo sine gratia per sua naturalia legis praecepta implere possit'). Now here as before, there is a part of Thomas anxious as far as may be to affirm man's proper power to moral determination, his native capacity for doing good. Before the Fall, then, and as far as the substance (as distinct from the spirit) of the law is concerned, man as man could meet the obligations laid upon him by God from out of his ordinary humanity. True, the situation did not last, grace, after the Fall, being a condition of obedience and of the righteousness thereof. But *before* the Fall man as man was equal to the task in hand:

... implere mandata legis contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad substantiam operum, prout scilicet homo operatur iusta et fortia, et alia virtutis opera. Et hoc modo homo in statu naturae integrae potuit omnia mandata legis implere, alioquin non potuisset in statu illo non peccare, cum nihil aliud sit peccare quam transgredi divina mandata. Sed in statu naturae corruptae non potest homo implere omnia mandata divina sine gratia sanante.

(ST Ia IIae.109.4 resp.)⁹

But the distinction between substance and spirit, between the *what* and the *how* of man's obedience to God's commandment, is, in the event, all important here; for the fulfilment of the law, in respect of the *spirit* of that fulfilment, is a matter of charity, and charity is a matter of grace, grace, therefore, as Augustine had long since maintained, being a condition of right doing both before and after the catastrophe:

Alio modo possunt impleri mandata legis non solum quantum ad substantiam operis, sed etiam quantum ad modum agendi, ut scilicet ex caritate fiant. Et sic neque in statu naturae integrae, neque in statu naturae corruptae, potest homo implere absque gratia legis mandata. Unde Augustinus, in libro de Corrept. et Grat., cum dixisset quod sine gratia nullum prorsus bonum homines faciunt, subdit, 'non solum ut, monstrante ipsa quid faciendum sit, sciunt; verum etiam ut, praestante ipsa, faciant cum dilectione quod sciunt'.

⁹ there are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of the law. The first regards the substance of the works, as when a man does works of justice, fortitude, and of other virtues, and in this way man in the state of perfect nature could fulfil all the commandments of the law; otherwise he would not have been able to sin in that state, since to sin is nothing other than to transgress the divine commandments. But in the state of corrupted nature man cannot fulfil all the divine commandments without healing grace.

Indigent insuper in utroque statu auxilio Dei moventis ad mandata implenda, ut dictum est.

(*ibid.*)¹⁰

Here too, then, Augustine carries the day, and this in a manner which, as far as Thomas is concerned, can only have reinforced his perplexity; for if by creation we mean the letting of a thing be in the fullness of that being, which is as much as to say in the fullness of its proper functionality and intelligibility, then to speak in this way of the need for grace before things have actually got under way must in some sense be to reflect adversely on the basic idea, on the notion of creation as in any sense equal to its own inner reasons.

Similarly exemplary in respect of Augustine's power to determine well-nigh single-handedly the course of the argument in the *Summa theologiae* is the case of 109.8, where it is a question of how far, if at all, man without grace can avoid sin ('Utrum homo sine gratia possit non peccare'). Thomas, typically, wishes to draw a distinction, for though in his fallenness man cannot avoid sinning venially (this being a matter of the waywardness of his lower parts), he can hold out against mortal sin, since reason, wherein mortal sin resides, if not necessarily more stable than the concupiscent part of human nature, is at least more biddable, more open to negotiation. Here, then, with a statement of the relatively robust character of man's moral presence in the world, is where Thomas begins:

In statu autem naturae corruptae, indiget homo gratia habituali sanante naturam, ad hoc quod omnino a peccato absterneatur. Quae quidem sanatio primo fit in praesenti vita secundum mentem, appetitu carnali nondum totaliter reparato, unde apostolus, ad Rom. VII, in persona hominis reparati, dicit, 'ego ipse mente servio legi Dei, carne autem legi peccati'. In quo quidem statu potest homo abstinere a peccato mortali quod in ratione consistit, ut supra habitum est. Non autem potest homo abstinere ab omni peccato veniali, propter

¹⁰ Secondly, the commandments of the law can be fulfilled, not merely as regards the substance of the act, but also as regards the mode of acting, i.e. their being done out of charity. And in this way, neither in the state of perfect nature, nor in the state of corrupt nature can man fulfil the commandments of the law without grace. Hence, Augustine, having in his book on *Rebuke and Grace* [ii.3, prin.] stated that 'without grace men can do no good whatever', adds 'Not only do they know by its light what to do, but by its help they do lovingly what they know'. Beyond this, in both states they need the help of God's motion as mover in order to fulfil the commandments, as stated above [arts 2 and 3]. Augustine (*loc. cit.*) has 'Intellegenda est enim gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum, qua sola homines liberantur a malo, et sine qua nullum prorsus sive cogitando, sive volendo et amando, sive agendo faciunt bonum: non solum ut monstrante ipsa quid faciendum sit sciant, verum etiam ut praestante ipsa faciant cum dilectione quod sciunt'.

corruptionem inferioris appetitus sensualitatis, cuius motus singulos quidem ratio reprimere potest (et ex hoc habent rationem peccati et voluntarii), non autem omnes, quia dum uni resistere nititur, fortassis alius insurgit; et etiam quia ratio non semper potest esse pervigil ad huiusmodi motus vitandos.

(*ST Ia IIa.109.8 resp.*)¹¹

To this extent, then, and even in the state of disobedience, there is scope for moral activity properly understood, and indeed for moral activity of a very high order, for the struggle against mortal sin is by definition a struggle for the very survival of the soul in its power to significant determination. But here as throughout in these grace questions of the *Summa theologiae*, Augustine is there to oversee and overturn the argument. Taking his cue, then, from a particularly ferocious passage in the *De perfectione iustitiae hominis* relative to the anathematization of anyone daring to set aside the ‘Lead us not into temptation’ clause of the Lord’s Prayer and thus to deny that we stand in need of grace for our salvation, he straightaway sets about the business of demolition, affirming as he does so the status of reason as, after all, an unstable quantity and liable to stray unless restored by grace. On the one hand, then, the *sed contra*, more than ever ominous in respect of Thomas’s preliminary liberalism at this point, his willingness in some measure to credit human nature in the moral viability of that nature:

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Perfect. Iustit., ‘quisquis negat nos orare debere ne intremus in tentationem (negat autem hoc qui contendit ad non peccandum gratiae Dei adiutorium non esse homini necessarium, sed, sola lege accepta, humanam sufficere voluntatem), ab auribus omnium removendum, et ore omnium anathematizandum esse non dubito’.

(*ibid. sed contra*)¹²

¹¹ But in the state of corrupt nature man needs grace to heal his nature in order that he may entirely abstain from sin. And in the present life this healing is wrought in the mind – the carnal appetite being not yet restored. Hence the Apostle, in Romans 7 [v. 25], says in the person of one who is restored: ‘I myself, with the mind, serve the law of God, but with the flesh, the law of sin.’ And in this state man can abstain from all mortal sin, which takes its stand in his reason, as stated above [qu. 74, art. 5]; but man cannot abstain from all venial sin on account of the corruption of his lower appetite of sensuality. For man can, indeed, repress each of its movements (by reason of which they are deemed sinful and voluntary), but not all, because while he is resisting one, another may arise, and also because the reason is not always alert to avoid these movements.

¹² On the contrary, Augustine says in his book *On the Perfection of Man’s Righteousness* [xxi.44, ult.]: ‘Whoever denies that we ought to say the prayer “Lead us not into

while on the other Thomas's gradual coming round in the remaining part of the response to the Augustinian point of view, to a sense that perhaps after all reason is not entirely equal to the matter in hand, to – unassisted by grace – holding at bay the ravages of mortal sin:

Similiter etiam antequam hominis ratio, in qua est peccatum mortale, reparetur per gratiam iustificantem, potest singula peccata mortalia vitare, et secundum aliquod tempus, quia non est necesse quod continuo peccet in actu. Sed quod diu maneat absque peccato mortali, esse non potest. Unde et Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod 'peccatum quod mox per poenitentiam non deletur, suo pondere ad aliud trahit'. Et huius ratio est quia, sicut rationi subdi debet inferior appetitus, ita etiam ratio debet subdi Deo, et in ipso constituere finem suae voluntatis. Per finem autem oportet quod regulentur omnes actus humani, sicut per rationis iudicium regulari debent motus inferioris appetitus. Sicut ergo, inferiori appetitu non totaliter subiecto rationi, non potest esse quin contingant inordinati motus in appetitu sensitivo; ita etiam, ratione hominis non existente subiecta Deo, consequens est ut contingant multae inordinationes in ipsis actibus rationis. Cum enim homo non habet cor suum firmatum in Deo, ut pro nullo bono consequendo vel malo vitando ab eo separari vellet; occurrunt multa propter quae consequenda vel vitanda homo recedit a Deo contemnendo praecepta ipsius, et ita peccat mortaliter, praecipue quia in repentinis homo operatur secundum finem praconceptum, et secundum habitum praexistentem, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic.; quamvis ex praemeditatione rationis homo possit aliquid agere praeter ordinem finis praconcepti, et praeter inclinationem habitus. Sed quia homo non potest semper esse in tali praemeditatione, non potest contingere ut diu permaneat quin operetur secundum consequentiam voluntatis deordinatae a Deo, nisi cito per gratiam ad debitum ordinem reparetur.

(*ibid.*, resp., ult.)¹⁵

temptation" (and they deny it who maintain that the help of God's grace is not necessary to man for salvation, but that the gift of the law is enough for the human will) ought without doubt to be removed beyond all hearing, and to be anathematized by the tongues of all.'

¹⁵ So, too, before man's reason, wherein is mortal sin, is restored by justifying grace, he can avoid each mortal sin, and for a time, since it is not necessary that he should be always actually sinning. But it cannot be that he remains for long without mortal sin; hence Gregory, on Ezekiel [*Hom.* xi], says that 'a sin not at once taken away by repentance, by its weight drags us down to other sins': and this because, as the lower appetite ought to be subject to the reason, so should the reason be subject to God, and should place in him the end of its will. Now it is by the end that all human acts ought to be regulated, even as it is by the judgment of the reason that the movements of the lower appetite should be

Now the general position here, to the effect that both the desire and the ability to do well by self as a creature of moral and eschatological accountability must ultimately be referred to God as the beginning and end of all desiring and all doing in man, is unremarkable, Thomas, with Augustine, being among the most attentive of theologians to the threat posed to the faith, and thus to theology as but the reasonable articulation of the faith, by Pelagianism. But it is difficult not to sense here, over and beyond the virtue of attentiveness, something approaching a species of intimidation, and, in consequence of this, of secession, a making way for something, if not foreign to self exactly (for we are speaking of one and the same Christian profession), then somewhat against the grain, more properly Augustinian in spirit than Thomist. As always, the matter needs careful statement, for Thomas is no less attuned to the tragic substance of the human situation in its post-Edenic phase than Augustine, the severe logic of it all weighing as heavily upon him as upon anybody else. But Augustine is Augustine, and his tremendous presence in the area of grace theology – an area of theology shaped not only by current controversy

regulated. And thus, even as inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite cannot help occurring since the lower appetite is not subject to reason, so likewise, since man's reason is not entirely subject to God, the consequence is that many disorders occur in the reason. For when man's heart is not so fixed on God as to be unwilling to be parted from him for the sake of finding any good or avoiding any evil, many things happen for the achieving or avoiding of which a man strays from God and breaks his commandments, and thus sins mortally; especially since, when surprised, a man acts according to his preconceived end and his pre-existing habits, as the Philosopher says in the third book of the *Ethics* [III.viii; 117a20-21], although with premeditation of his reason he may do something outside the order of his preconceived end and the inclination of his habit. But because a man cannot always have this premeditation, it cannot help occurring that he acts in accordance with his will turned aside from God, unless, by grace, he is quickly brought back to due order. *ScG* III.clx. 3-4: 'Ad hoc etiam operantur impetus corporalium passionum; et appetibilia secundum sensum; et plurimae occasiones male agendi; quibus de facili homo provocatur ad peccandum, nisi retrahatur per firmam inhaesionem ad ultimum finem, quam gratia facit. Unde apparet stulta Pelagianorum opinio, qui dicebant hominem in peccato existentem sine gratia posse vitare peccata. Cuius contrarium apparet ex hoc quod Psalmus petit "dum defecerit virtus mea, ne derelinquas me. Et dominus orare nos docet et ne nos inducas in tentationem, sed libera nos a malo"; *De ver.* 24.12 resp.: 'Et ideo post statum naturae corruptae non est in potestate liberi arbitrii omnia huiusmodi peccata vitare, quia eius actum effugiunt, quamvis possit impedire aliquem istorum motuum, si contra conetur. Non est autem possibile ut homo continue contra conetur ad huiusmodi motus vitandos, propter varias humanae mentis occupationes et quietem necessariam. Quod quidem contingit ex hoc quod inferiores vires non sunt totaliter rationi subiectae, sicut erant in statu innocentiae, quando homini huiusmodi peccata omnia et singula per liberum arbitrium vitare facillimum erat, eo quod nullus motus in inferioribus viribus insurgere poterat nisi secundum dictamen rationis. Ad hanc autem rectitudinem homo in praesenti per gratiam non reducit communiter loquendo; sed hanc rectitudinem expectamus in statu gloriae.'

but by the content of his own troubled existence – leaves little room for manoeuvre, little scope for sidestepping the archetypal utterance.

Lest the reader be tempted to see in all this an element of exaggeration, it is worth noting the way in which, in consequence of the gradual ascendancy of the Augustinian over the Aristotelian component of his spirituality, the Thomas of the *Prima secundae* actually reverses positions in the earlier *Scriptum*. Take, for example, the question as to whether or not the soul is necessarily graced in consequence of doing what it can – ‘facienti quod in se est’ – in the light of conscience (‘Utrum necessario detur gratia se praeparanti, vel facienti quod in se est’, *ST* Ia IIae.112.3), at which point Paul, the Areopagite and Anselm as the ‘objectors’ each in his way suggests that God’s response to those doing their best in the light of conscience will always be a positive one.¹⁴ And this, in the *Scriptum*, is Thomas’s position, his too being a commitment to the notion that just as form enters willingly into matter as well disposed, so grace enters willingly into the spirit as duly open to it, God’s, therefore, always being an inclination to reply in kind, to do *his* best for those doing *their* best:

Loquendo autem de necessitate quae est ex suppositione divini propositi, quo propter benevolentiam suae bonitatis voluit unicuique eam communicare secundum suam capacitatem, necessarium est quod cuilibet materiae praeparatae forma infundatur.

(*Scriptum* 4, d. 17, q. 1, art. 2, qc. 3, resp.)¹⁵

– a passage presupposing on analogy with the preparedness of matter in respect of the form about to be infused the readiness of the beneficiary in respect of the benefactor. But by the time we reach the *Prima secundae*

¹⁴ *ST* Ia IIae.112.3, objs. 1 and 2: ‘Videtur quod ex necessitate detur gratia se praeparanti ad gratiam, vel facienti quod in se est. Quia super illud Rom. V, “iustificati ex fide pacem habeamus” etc., dicit Glossa, “Deus recipit eum qui ad se confugit, aliter esset in eo iniquitas”. Sed impossibile est in Deo iniquitatem esse. Ergo impossibile est quod Deus non recipiat eum qui ad se confugit. Ex necessitate igitur gratiam assequitur ... Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, in libro de casu Diaboli, quod ista est causa quare Deus non concedit Diabolo gratiam, quia ipse non voluit accipere, nec paratus fuit. Sed remota causa, necesse est removeri effectum. Ergo si aliquis velit accipere gratiam, necesse est quod ei detur.’ More especially, in view of what follows, Dionysius in obj. 3: ‘Praeterea, bonum est communicativum sui; ut patet per Dionysium, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed bonum gratiae est melius quam bonum naturae. Cum igitur forma naturalis ex necessitate adveniat materiae dispositae, videtur quod multo magis gratia ex necessitate detur praeparanti se ad gratiam.’

¹⁵ Speaking, then, of the kind of necessity pertaining to the suppositum of divine willing, by which God wishes out of his benevolence and goodness to communicate that goodness to everything according to its capacity, it is necessary that form is infused into matter as properly prepared.

the situation is less sanguine, grace, inasmuch as it countenances nature, countenancing it only in the degree to which it is graced in the first place, such deserving as nature has, therefore, being no real deserving at all, but rather (as Thomas puts it) something closer to inevitability or infallibility (*infallibilitas*), to a necessary working-out of God's prior purposes:

praeparatio ad hominis gratiam est a Deo sicut a movente, a libero autem arbitrio sicut a moto. Potest igitur praeparatio dupliciter considerari. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod est a libero arbitrio. Et secundum hoc, nullam necessitatem habet ad gratiae consecutionem, quia donum gratiae excedit omnem praeparationem virtutis humanae. Alio modo potest considerari secundum quod est a Deo movente. Et tunc habet necessitatem ad id ad quod ordinatur a Deo, non quidem coactionis, sed infallibilitatis, quia intentio Dei deficere non potest; secundum quod et Augustinus dicit, in libro *de Praedest. Sanct.*, 'quod per beneficia Dei certissime liberantur quicumque liberantur'. Unde si ex intentione Dei moventis est quod homo cuius cor movet, gratiam consequatur, infallibiliter ipsam consequitur ...

(*ST Ia IIae.112.3 resp.*)¹⁶

Thus free will as the power in man to moral determination has now no real part to play in this at all, for free will, properly understood, is nothing but the means of God's working out his own plan for man, his own fail-safe scheme in man's regard, Augustine once again standing by to confirm in this sense the unilateralism of it all, its more or less complete one-sidedness. The old, in short, has been eclipsed by the new, and, with it, by a darker and less differentiated discourse than Thomas, left to himself, would probably have wished to entertain. And that is not all, for what applies in Question 112 by way of revising erstwhile emphases applies also in Question 109 in relation to the adequacy or otherwise of habitual grace for the purposes of doing good and of avoiding evil. The expression 'habitual grace', Thomas says in the *Summa*, denotes the steady

¹⁶ man's preparation for grace is from God, as mover, and from free will, as moved. Hence preparation may be looked at in two ways: first, as it is from free-will, and thus there is no necessity that it should obtain grace, since the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But it may be considered, secondly, as it is from God as mover, and thus it has a necessity – not indeed of coercion, but of infallibility – as regards what it is ordained to by God, since God's intention, according to the saying of Augustine in his book on the *Predestination of the Saints* [*De dono persever.* xiv.35, prin.] to the effect that 'by God's good gifts, whoever is liberated, is most certainly liberated', cannot fail. Hence if God intends, while moving, that the one whose heart he moves should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to it ...

state of divine solicitude whereby the soul is healed from its infirmities and lifted by way of good works to an order of happiness exceeding the possibilities of nature pure and simple: 'Uno quidem modo, quantum ad aliquod habituale donum, per quod natura humana corrupta sanetur; et etiam sanata eleuetur ad operandum opera meritoria vitae aeternae, quae excedunt proportionem naturae' (*ST Ia IIae.109.9 resp.*).¹⁷ Over and above this, however, there is the occasional grace whereby the soul is moved to a particular undertaking: 'Alio modo indiget homo auxilio gratiae ut a Deo moveatur ad agendum' (*ibid.*),¹⁸ habitual grace thus requiring within the economy of the whole any number of transient effluxes of divine assistance as the condition of its proper operation:

Quantum igitur ad primum auxilii modum, homo in gratia existens non indiget alio auxilio gratiae quasi aliquo alio habitu infuso. Indiget tamen auxilio gratiae secundum alium modum, ut scilicet a Deo moveatur ad recte agendum. Et hoc propter duo. Primo quidem, ratione generali, propter hoc quod, sicut supra dictum est, nulla res creata potest in quemcumque actum prodire nisi virtute motionis divinae. Secundo, ratione speciali, propter conditionem status humanae naturae. Quae quidem licet per gratiam sanetur quantum ad mentem, remanet tamen in ea corruptio et infectio quantum ad carnem, per quam servit legi peccati, ut dicitur ad Rom. VII. Remanet etiam quaedam ignorantiae obscuritas in intellectu, secundum quam, ut etiam dicitur Rom. VIII, 'quid oremus sicut oportet, nescimus'. Propter varios enim rerum eventus, et quia etiam nosipsos non perfecte cognoscimus, non possumus ad plenum scire quid nobis expediat; secundum illud Sap. IX, 'cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae'. Et ideo necesse est nobis ut a Deo dirigamur et protegatur, qui omnia novit et omnia potest.

(*ST Ia IIae.109.9 resp.*)¹⁹

¹⁷ First, a habitual gift whereby corrupted nature is healed, and, after being healed, is lifted up so as to work deeds meritorious of everlasting life, which exceed the capability of nature.

¹⁸ In another way, man needs the help of grace in order to be moved by God to act.

¹⁹ Now with regard to the first kind of help, man does not need a further help of grace – for example, a further infused habit. Yet he needs the help of grace in another way, namely, in order to be moved by God to act righteously, and this for two reasons: first, for the general reason that no created thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of divine motion. Secondly, for this special reason – the condition of the state of human nature. For although healed by grace as to the mind, yet it remains corrupted and poisoned in the flesh, whereby, as it says in Romans 7 [v. 25] it serves the law of sin. In the intellect, too, there remains the darkness of ignorance, whereby, as is said in Romans 8 [v. 26], 'We know not what we should pray for as we ought'; since on account of the various

Thus Thomas, in the *Prima secundae*, offers an account of grace under the aspect of reiteration, there being in his view no possibility of man's making good on the plane of right doing other than by way of a constant process of divine guiding and guarding ('ut a Deo dirigamur et protegatur'), a position notably more severe than that advanced in the *Scriptum*:

Supra dictum est, quod quamvis homo non haberet unde proficere posset, habuit tamen unde posset stare. Ergo liberum arbitrium sufficiebat ad iustitiam retinendam. Et dicendum, quod ab eadem causa est esse rei et conservatio ejus; unde sicut esse iustitiae gratuitae non est nisi a Deo; ita etiam et conservatio ejus. Sed verum est quod homo habens gratiam non indiget alia gratia ad ejus conservationem, et propter hoc dicitur, quod homo potest per se stare.

(*Scriptum 2*, d. 29, qu. 1, art. 5 *expositio textus*)²⁰

turns of circumstances, and because we do not know ourselves perfectly, we cannot fully know what is for our good, according to Wisdom 9 [v. 14]: 'For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain.' Hence we must be guided and guarded by God, who knows and can do all things. On grace as super-additionality, *ScG* III.c1.3 and 6: 'Oportet autem hanc gratiam aliquid in homine gratificato esse, quasi quandam formam et perfectionem ipsius. Quod enim in aliquem finem dirigitur, oportet quod habeat continuum ordinem in ipsum: nam movens continue mutat quousque mobile per motum finem sortiatur. Cum igitur auxilio divinae gratiae homo dirigatur in ultimum finem, ut ostensum est, oportet quod continue homo isto auxilio potiatur, quousque ad finem perveniat. Hoc autem non esset si praedictum auxilium participaret homo secundum aliquem motum aut passionem, et non secundum aliquam formam manentem, et quasi quiescentem in ipso: motus enim et passio talis non esset in homine nisi quando actu converteretur in finem; quod non continue ab homine agitur, ut praecipue patet in dormientibus. Est ergo gratia gratum faciens aliqua forma et perfectio in homine manens, etiam quando non operatur ... Oportet quod homo ad ultimum finem per proprias operationes perveniat. Unumquodque autem operatur secundum propriam formam. Oportet igitur, ad hoc quod homo perducatur in ultimum finem per proprias operationes, quod superaddatur ei aliqua forma, ex qua eius operationes efficaciam aliquam accipiant promerendi ultimum finem'; *ST* Ia IIae.110.2 resp. and ad 1: 'Multo igitur magis illis quos movet ad consequendum bonum supernaturale aeternum, infundit aliquas formas seu qualitates supernaturales, secundum quas suaviter et prompte ab ipso moveantur ad bonum aeternum consequendum. Et sic donum gratiae qualitas quaedam est ... ergo dicendum quod gratia, secundum quod est qualitas, dicitur agere in animam non per modum causae efficientis, sed per modum causae formalis, sicut albedo facit album, et iustitia iustum', etc.

²⁰ As was noted above, although man would not have what is required for his ultimate fruition, he nevertheless had what was necessary for his standing as man. Free will, therefore sufficed for the purposes of holding fast to righteousness. We have, moreover, to maintain that both the being of a thing and its preservation proceed from the same cause; therefore, just as the gift of justice in its essence is of none other than God, so also is its preservation. But it is true that a man in possession of grace requires no further grace for his preservation, and this is why we say that man is sufficient for his standing as man.

What, then, has happened here? What has happened is that a disposition once rich in its commitment to the possibility of man's 'self-standing' (the 'quod homo potest per se stare' of the passage just quoted) on the basis of his justification by grace has been overtaken by something distinctly strange, by a sense of grace as nothing other than a searching out of further grace as the ground and guarantee of its efficacy as a principle of well-doing:

Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura et gratia, quod 'sicut oculus corporis plenissime sanus, nisi candore lucis adiutus, non potest cernere; sic et homo perfectissime etiam iustificatus, nisi aeterna luce iustitiae divinitus adiuvetur, recte non potest vivere'. Sed iustificatio fit per gratiam; secundum illud Rom. III: 'Iustificatio gratis per gratiam ipsius'. Ergo etiam homo iam habens gratiam indiget alio auxilio gratiae ad hoc quod recte vivat.

(*ST Ia IIae.109.9 sed contra*)²¹

Here too, then, Augustine is triumphant, the effect of his presence to Thomas being to empty the notion of free will as the means of reasonable self-determination in man of anything resembling genuine soteriological significance. Free will functions, certainly, but it functions within the context, and as the means, of divine rather than of human intentionality. Man, inasmuch as he is called upon to cooperate with God in the working out of the cosmic plan, is called upon to cooperate with him, not as one who moves, but as one who is moved, as one knowing himself only in the passivity – and thus only in the paradox – of his presence in the world as a creature of moral and ontological accountability.

3. Direct references in Dante to Augustine are few in number.²² In the *Convivio* there are four, though given their imprecision, it may be a matter

²¹ On the contrary, as Augustine says in his book on nature and grace [xxvi.29, ult.], 'as the eye of the body, though most healthy, cannot see unless it is helped by the brightness of light, so, neither can a man, even if confirmed in all righteousness, live well unless he be helped by the eternal light of justice'. But according to Romans 3 [v. 24], justification is by grace: 'Being justified freely by his grace.' Hence even a man who already possesses grace needs a further assistance of grace in order to live righteously.

²² G. Boffito, *Dante, S. Agostino ed Egidio Colonna (Romano)* (Florence: Olschki, 1911); C. Calcaterra, 'Sant'Agostino nelle opere di Dante e del Petrarca', in *S. Agostino. Pubblicazione commemorativa del XV centenario della sua morte*, special supplement to *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* 23 (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1931), pp. 422-99 (reprinted in *Nella selva di Dante* (Bologna: Cappelli, 1942); P. Chioccioni, *L'agostinismo nella Divina Commedia* (Florence: Olschki, 1952); F. X. Newman, 'St Augustine's Three Visions and the Structure of the *Commedia*', *Modern Language Notes* 82 (1967), 56-78 (subsequently in *Dante*, ed. H. Bloom (New York and Philadelphia: Chelsea House, 1986), pp. 65-81, and in R. Lansing

here merely of memory or of second-hand citation: I.ii.14, with its account of how from time to time an author has perforce to speak of himself for the purposes of benefitting his neighbour, an allusion possibly to *Conf.* X.iii.4 and/or X.iv. 6;²³ I.iv.9, on the stain of sin everywhere proper to

(ed.), *Dante: The Critical Complex*, 8 vols (New York: Routledge, 2003), vol. 6, pp. 146-68); G. Fallani, 'Dante e S. Agostino', in *L'esperienza teologica di Dante* (Lecce: Milella, 1976), pp. 185-203; G. Mazzotta, *Dante, Poet of the Desert. History and Allegory in the Divine Comedy* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); J. Freccero, *Dante: The Poetics of Conversion*, ed. and intro. R. Jacoff (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); C. A. Cioffi, 'St Augustine Revisited: on "Conversion" in the *Commedia*', *Lectura Dantis* 5 (1989), 68-80 (subsequently in R. Lansing (ed.), *Dante: The Critical Complex*, 8 vols (New York: Routledge, 2003), vol. 4, pp. 372-84); I. Opelt, 'Augustinus bei Dante', in A. Zumkeller (ed.), *Signum pietatis. Festgabe für Cornelius Petrus Mayer O.S.A. zum 60. Geburtstag* (Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1989), pp. 523-27; M. Nussbaum, 'Augustine and Dante on the Ascent of Love', in G. B. Matthews (ed.), *The Augustinian Tradition* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 61-90; P. S. Hawkins, 'Augustine, Dante, and the Dialectic of Ineffability', in *Dante's Testaments: Essays in Scriptural Imagination* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 213-28; originally in P. S. Hawkins and A. H. Schotter (eds), *Ineffability. Naming the Unnamable from Dante to Beckett* (New York: AMS Press, 1984), pp. 5-22, with, idem, 'Divide and Conquer: Augustine in the *Divine Comedy*' at pp. 197-212 (originally in *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America*, 106 (1991), 3, 471-82 and subsequently in R. Lansing (ed.), *Dante, The Critical Complex*, 8 vols (New York: Routledge, 2003), vol. 4, pp. 343-54); S. Sarteschi, 'Sant'Agostino in Dante e nell'età di Dante', in *Per correr miglior acque. Bilanci e prospettive degli studi danteschi alle soglie del nuovo millennio. Atti del Convegno internazionale di Verona-Ravenna 25-29 ottobre 1999*, 2 vols (Rome: Salerno Editrice, 2001), vol. 2, pp. 1075-97 (subsequently in *Per la 'Commedia' e non per essa soltanto* (Rome: Bulzoni, 2002), pp. 171-94); idem, 'Sant'Agostino in Dante', in F. Ela Consolino (ed.), *L'adorabile vescovo di Ippona. Atti del Convegno di Paola, 24-25 maggio 2000* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubettino, 2001), pp. 275-303; F. Tateo, 'Agostino fra Dante e Petrarca', in *Riscrittura come interpretazione. Dagli umanisti a Leopardi* (Rome and Bari: Laterza, 2001), pp. 3-33; idem, 'Percorsi agostiniani in Dante', *Deutsches Dante-Jahrbuch* 76 (2001), 43-56; R. Hollander, 'Dante's Reluctant Allegiance to St Augustine in the *Commedia*', *L'Alighieri* 49, n.s. 32 (2008), 5-15.

²³ *Conv.* I.ii.14: 'L'altra è quando, per ragionare di sé, grandissima utilidade ne segue altrui per via di dottrina; e questa ragione mosse Agustino ne le sue Confessioni a parlare di sé, ché per lo processo de la sua vita, lo quale fu di [non] buono in buono, e di buono in migliore, e di migliore in ottimo, ne diede essempro e dottrina, la quale per sì vero testimonio ricevere non si potea.' *Conf.* X.iii.4: 'Et delectat bonos audire praeterita mala eorum, qui iam carent eis, nec ideo delectat, quia mala sunt, sed quia fuerunt et non sunt. Quo itaque fructu, Domine meus, cui quotidie confitetur conscientia mea spe misericordiae tuae securior quam innocentia sua, quo fructu, quaeso, etiam hominibus coram te confiteor per has litteras adhuc, quis ego sim, non quis fuerim?'; X.iv.6 (also for the 'Ma però che ciascuno uomo a ciascuno uomo naturalmente è amico, e ciascuno amico si duole del difetto di colui ch'elli ama, coloro che a così alta mensa sono cibati non senza misericordia sono inver di quelli che in bestiale pastura veggiono erba e ghiande sen gire mangiando' sequence of *Conv.* I.i.8): 'Hic est fructus confessionum mearum, non qualis fuerim, sed qualis sim, ut hoc confitear non tantum coram te secreta exultatione cum tremore, et secreto maerore cum spe, sed etiam in auribus credentium filiorum

man as man, a reference, maybe, to *Conf.* I.vii.11 (though not only is the parallel inexact but the notion is everywhere in Augustine);²⁴ IV.ix.8, on the righteous having no need of the written law, reminiscent, possibly, of passages in the *De libero arbitrio* or else the *Enarrationes in Psalmos*;²⁵ and IV.xxi.14 on the importance of reining in youthful passion in the interests of properly human happiness, an echo, perhaps, of something similar in the *Confessions* and in the *De ordine*.²⁶ In the *Monarchia* there are two references to him in a single chapter (III.iv), one to the *De civitate Dei* and the other to the *De doctrina christiana*, where on both occasions it is a question of hermeneutics, of the extent to which the biblical text may be properly understood to yield a mystical meaning.²⁷ Two further

hominum, sociorum gaudii mei et consortium mortalitatis meae, ciuium meorum et mecum peregrinorum, praecedentium et consequentium et comitum viae meae.'

²⁴ *Conv.* I.iv.9: 'La terza si è l'umana impuritate, la quale si prende da la parte di colui ch'è giudicato, e non è senza familiaritate e conversazione alcuna. Ad evidenza di questa, è da sapere che l'uomo è da più parti maculato, e, come dice Agustino, "nullo è senza macula"'. *Conf.* I.vii.11: 'Quis me commemorat peccatum infantiae meae, quoniam "nemo mundus a peccato coram te, nec infans, cuius est unius diei vita super terram"' (after Job 14:4 and 15:14). E. Moore, *Studies in Dante. First Series: Scripture and Classical Authors in Dante*, ed. and intro. C. Hardie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969; originally 1896), pp. 291-92.

²⁵ *Conv.* IV.ix.8: 'Onde dice Augustino: "Se questa – cioè equitate – li uomini la conoscessero, e conosciuta servassero, la ragione scritta non sarebbe mestiere"; e però è scritto nel principio del Vecchio Digesto: "La ragione scritta è arte di bene e d'equitate"'. *De lib. arb.* I.xv.31: 'eos vero qui legi aeternae per bonam voluntatem haerent, temporalis legis non indigere, satis, ut apparet, intellegis'; *En. in psalmos* 1 (v. 2): 'Deinde aliud est lex quae scribitur, et imponitur servienti; aliud lex quae mente conspicitur, ab eo qui non indiget litteris.'

²⁶ *Conv.* IV.xxi.14: 'E però vuole santo Augustino, e ancora Aristotile nel secondo de l'Etica, che l'uomo s'ausi a ben fare e a rifrenare le sue passioni, acciò che questo tallo, che detto è, per buona consuetudine induri, e rifermissi ne la sua rettitudine, sì che possa fruttificare, e del suo frutto uscire la dolcezza de l'umana felicitade.' *Conf.* IX.viii.17: 'Hac ratione praeciendi et auctoritate imperandi frenabat aviditatem tenerioris aetatis et ipsam puellarum sitim formabat ad honestum modum, ut iam nec liberet quod non deceret'; *De ord.* II.viii.25: 'Haec igitur disciplina eis qui illam nosse desiderant, simul geminum ordinem sequi iubet, cuius una pars vitae, altera eruditionis est. Adolescentibus ergo studiosis eius ita vivendum est ut a venereis rebus, ab illecebris ventris et gutturis, ab immodesto corporis cultu et ornatu, ab inanibus negotiis ludorum, a torpore somni atque pigritiae, ab aemulatione, obtreccatione, invidentia, ab honorum potestatumque ambitionibus, ab ipsius etiam laudis immodica cupiditate se absteineant.' M. Corti, *La felicità mentale* (Turin: Einaudi, 1983), p. 112 with a possible source, citing Augustine, from Albert the Great (*Super Eth.* II, lect. 2).

²⁷ *Mon.* III.iv.7-8: 'Propter primum dicit Augustinus in Civitate Dei: "Non omnia que gesta narrantur etiam significare aliquid putanda sunt, sed propter illa que aliquid significant etiam ea que nichil significant actexuntur. Solo vomere terra proscinditur; sed ut hoc fieri possit, etiam cetera aratri membra sunt necessaria". Propter secundum idem ait in Doctrina Cristiana, loquens de illo aliud in Scripturis sentire quam ille qui

passages, one in the *Monarchia* at III.iii.13 and one in the letter to the Italian cardinals, note the prominence of Augustine among the Fathers, the former commending him as a servant of the Holy Spirit and thus as nourishment for the pious soul, and the latter lamenting the neglect into which he has now fallen.²⁸ Also among the letters there is an invitation to read Augustine – the Augustine of the *De quantitate animae* – on the exaltation or apotheosis of the spirit as bearing on the *Paradiso* as itself an essay in spiritual ecstasis.²⁹ As for the *Commedia*, there are just two references to Augustine, one – by way, probably, of Orosius – indirect (the ‘Ne l’altra piccioletta luce ride / quello avvocato de’ tempi cristiani / del cui latino Augustin si provide’ of *Par.* X.118-20),³⁰ and the other celebrating him, not, in fact, as a theologian, but, alongside Benedict and Francis, as a founder of one of the great orders (the ‘sotto lui così cerner sortiro / Francesco, Benedetto e Augustino / e altri fin qua giù di giro in giro’ of *Par.* XXXII.34-36).³¹ But for all the apparently slight nature of his

scripsit eas dicit, quod “ita fallitur ac si quisquam deserens viam eo tamen per girum pergeret quo via illa perducit”; et subdit: “Demonstrandum est ut consuetudine deviandi etiam in transversum aut perversum ire cogatur.”’ *De civ. Dei* XVI.ii.3: ‘Non sane omnia, quae gesta narrantur, aliquid etiam significare putanda sunt; sed propter illa, quae aliquid significant, etiam ea, quae nihil significant, attextuntur. Solo enim vomere terra proscinditur; sed ut hoc fieri possit, etiam cetera aratri membra sunt necessaria ...’; *De doct. christ.* I.xxxvi.41: ‘ita fallitur, ac si quisquam errore deserens viam, eo tamen per agrum pergat quo etiam via illa perducit.’

²⁸ *Mon.* III.iii.13: ‘Sunt etiam Scripture doctorum, Augustini et aliorum, quos a Spiritu Sancto adiutos qui dubitat, fructus eorum vel omnino non vidit vel, si vidit, minime degustavit’; *Ep.* xi.16: ‘Iacet Gregorius tuus in telis araneorum, iacet Ambrosius in neglectis clericorum latibulis, iacet Augustinus adiectus ...’

²⁹ *Ep.* xiii.80: ‘Et ubi ista invidis non sufficiant, legant Richardum de Sancto Victore in libro De Contemplatione; legant Bernardum in libro De Consideratione; legant Augustinum in libro De Quantitate Anime, et non invidentur.’ Augustine (*De quant. anim.* xxxiii.76) as a possibility here: ‘Iamvero in ipsa visione atque contemplatione veritatis, qui septimus atque ultimus animae gradus est; neque iam gradus, sed quaedam mansio, quo illis gradibus pervenitur; quae sint gaudia, quae perfructio summi et veri boni, cuius serenitatis atque aeternitatis afflatus, quid ego dicam? Dixerunt haec quantum dicenda esse iudicaverunt, magnae quaedam et incomparabiles animae, quas etiam vidisse ac videre ista credimus. Illud plane ego nunc audeo tibi dicere, nos si cursum quem nobis Deus imperat, et quem tenendum suscepimus, constantissime tenuerimus, perventuros per Virtutem Dei atque Sapientiam ad summam illam causam, vel summum auctorem, vel summum principium rerum omnium, vel si quo alio modo res tanta congruentius appellari potest ...’

³⁰ In the next little light smiles that defender of the Christian times, of whose discourse Augustine made use. C. Reissner, *Paradiso* X.118-120: “quello avvocato de’ tempi cristiani”: Orosius oder Lactantius?, *Deutsches Dante-Jahrbuch* 47 (1972), 58-76.

³¹ and beneath him, Francis and Benedict and Augustine and others were allotted, as far down as here, from circle to circle.

presence to Dante in the text, we should not be misled, for the statistics by no means reflect the depth of their companionship as fellow travellers, as engaged one with the other at the point both of cosmological and of ontological – and more especially still of psycho-ontological – concern. When, for example, in the *Convivio*, Dante seeks to confirm his sense of the fundamentally affective structure of the universe, of the cosmos as no more than the sum total of its love-impulses, there ready and waiting is Augustine with the necessary conceptual and expressive apparatus, with his own distinctive sense of the love-gravitation of everything that *is* in the world and of how, ideally, the notion stands to be expressed. On the one hand, then, the *Convivio* at III.iii.2-5:

Onde è da sapere che ciascuna cosa, come detto è di sopra, per la ragione di sopra mostrata ha 'l suo speziale amore. Come le corpora semplici hanno amore naturato in sé a lo luogo proprio, e però la terra sempre discende al centro; lo fuoco ha [amore a] la circonferenza di sopra, lungo lo cielo de la luna, e però sempre sale a quello. Le corpora composte prima, sì come sono le minere, hanno amore a lo luogo dove la loro generazione è ordinata, e in quello crescono e acquistano vigore e potenza; onde vedemo la calamita sempre da la parte de la sua generazione ricevere virtù. Le piante, che sono prima animate, hanno amore a certo luogo più manifestamente, secondo che la complessione richiede; e però vedemo certe piante lungo l'acque quasi c[ontent]arsi, e certe sopra li gioghi de le montagne, e certe ne le piagge e dappiè monti: le quali se si transmutano, o muoiono del tutto o vivono quasi triste, disgiunte dal loro amico. Li animali bruti hanno più manifesto amore non solamente a li luoghi, ma l'uno l'altro vedemo amare. Li uomini hanno loro proprio amore a le perfette e oneste cose. E però che l'uomo, avvegna che una sola sustanza sia, tuttavia [la] forma, per la sua nobilitade, ha in sé e la natura [d'ognuna di] queste cose, tutti questi amori puote avere e tutti li ha.³²

³² It should be explained here that, as was said above, for the reason given there, every being has a love specific to it. Just as simple bodies have an inborn love for the place proper to them – so that earth always descends to the centre, while fire has an inborn love for the circumference above us bordering the heaven of the Moon, and therefore always rises upwards towards that – so primary compound bodies, such as minerals, have a love for the place suited to their generation; in that place they grow, and from it they derive their vigour and power. That is why, as we observe, the magnet always receives power from the quarter in which it was generated. Plants, which are the primary form of animate life, even more clearly have a love for certain places, in accordance with what their constitution requires; and so we see that some plants rejoice, as it were, when alongside water, others when on the ridges of mountains, others when on slopes and on foothills; if they are transplanted, they either die completely or live a sad life, as it were,

while on the other, the *City of God* at XI.xxviii:

Si enim pecora essemus, carnalem vitam et quod secundum sensum eius est amaremus idque esset sufficiens bonum nostrum et secundum hoc, cum esset nobis bene, nihil aliud quaereremus. Item si arbores essemus, nihil quidem sentiente motu amare possemus, verumtamen id quasi appetere videremur, quo feracius essemus uberiusque fructuosae. Si essemus lapides aut fluctus aut ventus aut flamma vel quid huiusmodi, sine ullo quidem sensu atque vita, non tamen nobis deesset quasi quidam nostrorum locorum atque ordinis appetitus. Nam velut amores corporum momenta sunt ponderum, sive deorsum gravitate sive sursum levitate nitantur. Ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore fertur, quocumque fertur.³³

And when in *Convivio* IV Dante is seeking to define the limits of specifically imperial authority (for strictly speaking the emperor's writ runs only in the area of pure positive law), there once again is Augustine, eager as ever to assist in shaping the argument. On the one hand, then, these lines from the *Convivio* at IV.ix.12-15:

E cose sono dove l'arte è in strumento de la natura, e queste sono meno arti; e in esso sono meno subietti li artefici a loro precipe: sì com'è dare lo seme a la terra (qui si vuole attendere la volontà dela natura); sì come è uscire di porto (qui si vuole attendere la naturale disposizione

like beings separated from their friends. Brute animals not only more clearly still have a love for particular places, but, as we observe, they also love one another. Human beings have their specific love, for what is perfect and just. And since the human being, despite the fact that his whole form constitutes a single substance in virtue of its nobility, has a nature that embraces all these features, he can have all these loves, and indeed does have them.

³³ If we were mere beasts we would love the life of sensuality and all that relates to it; this would be our sufficient good, and when this was satisfied, we should seek nothing further. If we were trees, we would not be able to love anything with any sensual emotion, yet we would seem to have a kind of desire for increased fertility and more abundant fruitfulness. If we were stones, waves, wind or flame, or anything of that kind, lacking sense and life, we would still show something like desire for our own place and order. For the specific gravity of a body is, in a manner, its love, whether a body tends downwards by reason of its heaviness or strives upwards because of its lightness. A material body is borne along by its weight in a particular direction, as a soul is by its love. Cf. *Conf.* XIII.ix.10: 'Corpus pondere suo nititur ad locum suum. Ponderis non ad ima tantum est, sed ad locum suum. Ignis sursum tendit, deorsum lapis. Ponderibus suis aguntur, loca sua petunt. Oleum infra aquam fusum super aquam attollitur, aqua supra oleum fusa, infra oleum demergitur; ponderibus suis aguntur, loca sua petunt. Minus ordinata inquieta sunt: ordinantur et quiescunt. Ponderis meum amor meus; eo feror, quocumque feror' (with the 'In bona voluntate pax nobis est' immediately preceding for *Par.* III.85).

del tempo). E però vedemo in queste cose spesse volte contenzione tra li artefici, e domandare consiglio lo maggiore al minore. Altre cose sono che non sono de l'arte, e paiono avere con quella alcuna parentela, e quindi sono li uomini molte volte ingannati; e in queste li discenti a lo artefice, o vero maestro, subietti non sono, né credere a lui sono tenuti quanto è per l'arte: sì come pescare pare aver parentela col navigare, e conoscere la virtù de l'erbe pare aver parentela con l'agricoltura; che non hanno insieme alcuna regola, con ciò sia cosa che 'l pescare sia sotto l'arte de la venagione e sotto suo comandare, e lo conoscere la virtù de l'erbe sia sotto la medicina o vero sotto più nobile dottrina. Queste cose simigliantemente che de l'altre arti sono ragionate, vedere si possono ne l'arte imperiale; ché regole sono in quella che sono pure arti, sì come sono le leggi de' matrimonii, de li servi, de le milizie, de li successori in dignitate, e di queste in tutto siamo a lo Imperadore subietti, senza dubbio e sospetto alcuno. Altre leggi sono che sono quasi seguitatrici di natura, sì come costituire l'uomo d'etade sofficiente a ministrare, e di queste non semo in tutto subietti.³⁴

while on the other, these from the *De doctrina christiana* at II.xxx.47:

Artium etiam ceterarum, quibus aliquid fabricatur, vel quod remaneat post operationem artificis ab illo effectum, sicut domus et scamnum et

³⁴ There are matters in which art functions merely as a means of nature. These are arts in a lesser sense, and in them the artisans are less subject to their leader. Instances of this are the sowing of seed in the ground (where the principal factor is the will of nature), and setting sail from port (where the principal factor is the kind of weather nature decrees). So in these matters we often see disputes arising among the artisans, and the superior asking advice of the inferior. There are other matters which do not, in fact, belong to a particular art, yet appear at first sight to pertain to it; when this situation occurs, many people fall into error. In such cases the apprentices are not subject to the master, and do not have any obligation to follow him, as they do when the art in question truly is involved. For instance, fishing appears at first sight to pertain to navigation, and knowing the qualities of herbs appears at first sight to pertain to agriculture. But in neither case are the two governed by the same rules, since fishing comes within the purview of the art of hunting and is subject to its laws, and knowing the qualities of herbs comes within the purview of medicine or of some even more noble branch of learning. The points made above with reference to the other arts hold good also with regard to the art of ruling as emperor. In this case, too, there are regulations which are arts to a high degree; such is the case with laws governing marriages, slavery, military service and the inheritance of titles. In all these we are, without the slightest doubt, subject to the emperor. There are other laws which are almost totally dictated by nature, such as that establishing the age at which a man is able to hold office, and in respect of these we are not entirely subject. J. Took, "Diligite iustitiam qui iudicatis terram": Justice and the Just Ruler in Dante', in J. R. Woodhouse (ed.), *Dante and Governance* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 137-51 (on the extent of imperial jurisdiction in Dante's understanding of it).

vas aliquod atque alia huiusmodi, vel quae ministerium quoddam
exhibent operanti Deo, sicut medicina et agricultura et gubernatio
...³⁵

And when, similarly, in an exquisite moment of the *Purgatorio* Dante wishes to explore the inclusivity of man's proper happiness as man, its somehow increasing in proportion to the number of those party to it, Augustine is yet again on hand to clarify the basic idea, his – and now Dante's – sense of the exponential or ever expanding structure of it all. On the one hand, then, this from the *Purgatorio* at XV.61-75:

“Com' esser puote ch'un ben, distributo
in più posseditor, faccia più ricchi
di sé che se da pochi è posseduto?”
Ed elli a me: “Però che tu rificchi
la mente pur a le cose terrene,
di vera luce tenebre dispicchi.
Quello infinito e ineffabil bene
che là sù è, così corre ad amore
com' a lucido corpo raggio vene.
Tanto si dà quanto trova d'ardore;

³⁵ Among other arts there are some concerned with the manufacture of a product which is a result of the labour of the artificer, like a house, a bench, a dish, or something else of this kind. Others exhibit a kind of assistance to the work of God, like medicine, agriculture, and navigation ... *De lib. arb.* I. viii.18: 'Illud est quod volo dicere: hoc quidquid est, quo pecoribus homo praeponitur, sive mens, sive spiritus, sive utrumque rectius appellatur (nam utrumque in divinis Libris invenimus), si dominetur atque imperet caeteris quibuscumque homo constat, tunc esse hominem ordinatissimum. Videmus enim habere nos non solum cum pecoribus, sed etiam cum arbustis et stirpibus multa communia: namque alimentum corporis sumere, crescere, gignere, vigere, arboribus quoque tributum videmus, quae infima quadam vita continentur; videre autem atque audire, et olfactu, gustatu, tactu corporalia sentire posse bestias, et acrius plerasque quam nos, cernimus et fatemur. Adde vires et valentiam firmitatemque membrorum, et celeritates facillimosque corporis motus, quibus omnibus quasdam earum superamus, quibusdam aequamur, a nonnullis etiam vincimur.' Also for this passage, however, Aquinas, *In Eth.* I, lect. 1, n. 16: 'quaecumque autem sunt talium etc., ponit ordinem habituum adinvicem. Contingit enim unum habitum operativum, quem vocat virtutem, sub alio esse. Sicut ars quae facit frena est sub arte equitandi, quia ille qui debet equitare praecipit artifici qualiter faciat frenum. Et sic est architector, idest principalis artifex respectu ipsius. Et eadem ratio est de aliis artibus, quae faciunt alia instrumenta necessaria ad equitandum, puta sellas, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Equestris autem ulterius ordinatur sub militari. Milites enim dicebantur antiquitus non solum equites, sed quicumque pugnatore ad vincendum. Unde sub militari continetur non solum equestris, sed omnis ars vel virtus ordinata ad bellicam operationem, sicut sagittaria, fundibularia vel quaecumque alia huiusmodi. Et per eundem modum aliae artes sub aliis.'

sì che, quantunque carità si stende,
 cresce sovr' essa l'eterno valore.
 E quanta gente più là sù s'intende,
 più v'è da bene amare, e più vi s'ama,
 e come specchio l'uno a l'altro rende".³⁶

while on the other, this from the *De civitate Dei* at XV.v:

Nullo enim modo fit minor accedente seu permanente consorte possessio bonitatis, immo possessio bonitas, quam tanto latius, quanto concordius individua sociorum possidet caritas. Non habebit denique istam possessionem, qui eam noluerit habere communem, et tanto eam reperiet amplioem, quanto amplius ibi potuerit amare consortem.³⁷

And when, finally, in a still more exquisite moment of the *Paradiso*, Dante wishes to confirm the mutual immanence of human and divine purposefulness in circumstances of consummate human being, and this as the basis of every kind of spiritual peace, then Augustine, in all the maturity of his at once episcopal and pastoral presence, is on hand to confirm him in the substance of his own intuition; on the one hand, then, Dante in the *Paradiso* at III.79-87:

Anzi è formale ad esto beato esse
 tenersi dentro a la divina voglia,
 per ch'una fansi nostre voglie stesse;
 sì che, come noi sem di soglia in soglia
 per questo regno, a tutto il regno piace
 com' a lo re che 'n suo voler ne 'nvoglia.
 E 'n la sua volontade è nostra pace,

³⁶ "How can it be that a good distributed can make more possessors richer with itself than if it is possessed by a few?" And he to me: "Because you still set your mind on earthly things, you gather darkness from true light. That infinite and ineffable good that is there above speeds to love as a ray of light comes to a bright body. So much it gives of itself as it finds of ardour, so that how far soever love extends, the more does the eternal goodness increase upon it; and the more souls there are that are enamoured there above, the more there are for loving well, and the more love is there, and like a mirror the one returns to the other."

³⁷ A man's possession of goodness is in no way diminished by the arrival, or the continuance, of a sharer in it; indeed, goodness is a possession enjoyed more widely by the united affection of partners in that possession, in proportion to the harmony that exists among them. In fact, anyone who refuses to enjoy this possession in partnership will not enjoy it at all; and he will find that he possesses it in ampler measure in proportion to his ability to love his partner in it.

ell' è quel mare al qual tutto si move
 ciò ch'ella crïa o che natura face.³⁸

while on the other, Augustine in the *Confessions* at XIII.ix.10:

In dono tuo requiescimus: ibi te fruimur. Requies nostra locus noster.
 Amor illuc attollit nos et spiritus tuus bonus exaltat humilitatem
 nostram de portis mortis. In bona voluntate pax nobis est.³⁹

Everywhere, therefore, the pattern is the same, for everywhere the Augustinian text – be it the *Confessions*, the *De doctrina christiana* or the *De civitate Dei* – is present to Dante as a friend, companion and comforter in the moment of elucidation, of clarifying above all for his own peace of mind the leading idea.

But with what amounts in this sense to the cherished reminiscence at the level of ideas we are as yet in the foothills where Dante and Augustine are concerned, for it is above all as a phenomenologist – as one engaged at the point, not now of the *what it is* but of the *how it is* with being in its lostness and foundness – that the great bishop is present to Dante as a fellow traveller. Take for example the opening lines of the *Commedia*, a meditation, whatever else they are, upon the symptomatology of estrangement as a condition of the spirit, on the kind of disorientation, self-forgetfulness, recidivism, and, as underlying and informing all these things, despair whereby the soul in its dividedness knows itself in the near-dissolution of self:

Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita
 mi ritrovai per una selva oscura,
 ché la diritta via era smarrita.
 Ahi quanto a dir qual era è cosa dura
 esta selva selvaggia e aspra e forte
 che nel pensier rinova la paura!
 Tant' è amara che poco è più morte;
 ma per trattar del ben ch'ï' vi trovai,
 dirò de l'altre cose ch'ï' v'ho scorte.

³⁸ Indeed, it is of the essence of this blessed existence to keep itself within the divine will, whereby our wills are made one; so that our being thus from threshold to threshold throughout this realm is a joy to all the realm as to the king, who inwills us with his will; and in his will is our peace. It is that sea to which all moves, both what it creates and what nature makes.

³⁹ In your gift we rest, and there we enjoy you. Our rest is our place. Love raises us there and your good spirit lifts up our lowliness from the gates of death. In your good will is our peace.

Io non so ben ridir com' i' v'intraï,
 tant' era pien di sonno a quel punto
 che la verace via abandonai

...

Ed ecco, quasi al cominciar de l'erta,
 una lonza leggera e presta molto,
 che di pel macolato era coverta;

e non mi si partia dinanzi al volto,
 anzi 'mpediva tanto il mio cammino,
 ch' i' fui per ritornar più volte vòlto.

Temp' era dal principio del mattino,
 e 'l sol montava 'n sù con quelle stelle
 ch' eran con lui quando l'amor divino

mosse di prima quelle cose belle;
 sì ch' a bene sperar m'era cagione
 di quella fiera a la gaetta pelle

l'ora del tempo e la dolce stagione;
 ma non sì che paura non mi desse
 la vista che m'apparve d'un leone.

Questi pareo che contra me venisse
 con la test' alta e con rabbiosa fame,
 sì che pareo che l'aere ne tremesse.

Ed una lupa, che di tutte brame
 sembiava carca ne la sua magrezza,
 e molte genti fé già viver grame,

questa mi porse tanto di gravezza
 con la paura ch'uscìa di sua vista,
 ch'io perdei la speranza de l'altezza.

(*Inf.* I.1-12 and 31-54)⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Midway in the journey of our life I found myself in a dark wood, for the straight way was lost. Ah, how hard it is to tell what that wood was, wild, rugged, harsh; the very thought of it renews my fear! It is so bitter that death is hardly more so. But, to treat of the good that I found in it, I will tell of the other things I saw there. I cannot rightly say how I entered it, I was so full of sleep at the moment I left the true way ... And behold, near the beginning of the steep, a leopard light-footed and very fleet, covered with a spotted hide! And it did not depart from before my eyes, but did so impede my way that more than once I turned round to go back. It was the beginning of the morning, and the sun was mounting with the stars that were with it when divine love first set those beautiful things in motion, so that the hour of the day and the sweet season gave me cause for good hope of that beast with the gay skin; yet not so much that I did not feel afraid at the sight of a lion that appeared to me and seemed to be coming at me, head high and raging with hunger, so that the air seemed to tremble at it; and a she-wolf, that in her leanness seemed laden with every craving and had already caused many to live in sorrow; she put such heaviness upon me with the fear that came from the sight of her that I lost hope of the height.

Here, certainly, Augustine is not far away, his too being an account of the substance and psychology of being in its *longe peregrinare* or far wandering,⁴¹ its standing over against self at the point of fundamental willing; so, then, to take first the substance of being in its remotion, as captive to the forces of self-destruction operative from out of the depths, these lines from the *Confessions* at VII.xxi.27 for the iconography of this first canto of the *Inferno*: 'Et aliud est de silvestri cacumine videre patriam pacis et iter ad eam non invenire et frustra conari per invidia circum obsidentibus et insidiantibus fugitivis desertoribus cum principe suo leone et dracone';⁴² while in respect of the mood or felt-condition of being in its alienation from self and from God as the beginning and end of the soul's every significant inflexion of the spirit (these two things coinciding within the moral and ontological economy of the whole), this passage from Book II of the *Confessions* (x.18) on the directionless of self in its lostness for the 'ché la diritta via era smarrita' and the 'esta selva selvaggia e aspra e forte' of *Inf.* I.3 and 5:

Defluxi abs te ego et erravi, Deus meus, nimis devius ab stabilitate tua in adulescentia et factus sum mihi regio egestatis.⁴³

⁴¹ For the terminology of far-offness ('longe peregrinare') of the soul in its alienation, *De doct. christ.* I.iv.4: 'Quomodo ergo, si essemus peregrini, qui beate vivere nisi in patria non possemus, eaque peregrinatione utique miseri et miseriam finire cupientes in patriam redire vellemus, opus esset vel terrestribus vel marinis vehiculis, quibus utendum esset, ut ad patriam, qua fruendum erat, pervenire valeremus; quod si amoenitates itineris et ipsa gestatio vehiculorum nos delectaret, conversi ad fruendum his, quibus uti debuimus, nollemus cito viam finire et perversa suavitate implicati alienaremur a patria, cuius suavitas faceret beatos ...'; *Conf.* II.ii.2: 'Tacebas tunc, et ego ibam porro longe a te in plura et plura sterilia semina dolorum superba deiectione et inquieta lassitudine'; V.ii. 2: 'Eant et fugiant a te inquieti iniqui'; VII.x.16: 'et inveni longe me esse a te in regione dissimilitudinis'; *De vera rel.* liv.105: 'Qui enim magis amant ire quam redire aut pervenire, in longinquiora mittendi sunt, quoniam caro sunt et spiritus ambulans et non revertens [Ps. 78:39]'; etc. Otherwise, Eph. 2:13: 'Nunc autem in Christo Jesu vos, qui aliquando eratis longe, facti estis prope in sanguine Christi' (with 'qui longe fuistis' at v. 17); Bernard, *Cant. cantie.* lvi.5 (*PL* 183, 1048-49); lxxxiii.1 (ibid. 1181D); lxxxiv.3 (ibid. 1185D), etc. Dante, in the *Paradiso* (VII.31-32), has 'u' la natura, che dal suo fattore / s'era allungata ...'. G. B. Ladner, 'Homo viator: Mediaeval Ideas on Alienation and Order', *Speculum* 42 (1967), 2, 233-59.

⁴² It is one thing to descry the land of peace from a wooded hilltop, and, unable to find the way to it, struggle on through trackless wastes where traitors and runaways, constrained by their prince, who is lion and serpent in one, lie in wait to attack. Cf. the 'Continete vos ab immani feritate superbiae, ab inerti voluptate luxuriae et a fallaci nomine scientiae, ut sint bestiae mansuetae et pecora edomita et innoxii serpentes. Motus enim animae sunt isti in allegoria: sed fastus elationis et delectatio libidinis et venenum curiositatis motus sunt animae mortuae ...' of XIII.xxi.30.

⁴³ But I deserted you, my God. In my youth I wandered away, too far from your sustaining hand, and created of myself a barren waste.

or these from the first book (vi.7) on the nightmare of self-unintelligibility for the 'io non so ben ridir com' i' v'intrai' of *Inf.* I.10:

Quid enim est quod volo dicere, domine, nisi quia nescio, unde venerim huc, in istam dico vitam mortalem an mortem vitalem?⁴⁴

or these from Book VIII (v.12) on the half-waking/half-sleeping truth of being in its dividedness for the 'tant' era pien di sonno a quel punto' of *Inf.* I.11:

Ita sarcina saeculi, velut somno assolet, dulciter premebar, et cogitationes, quibus meditabar in te, similes erant conatibus expergisci volentium, qui tamen superati soporis altitudine remerguntur.⁴⁵

or these from Book VII (iii.5 and xvii.23) on the rhythm of retreat for the 'ch'i' fui per ritornar più volte vòlto' of *Inf.* I.36 and the 'mi ripigneva là dove 'l sol tace' of *Inf.* I.60:⁴⁶

Itaque aciem mentis de profundo educere conatus mergebar iterum et saepe conatus mergebar iterum atque iterum ... sed aciem figere non evalui et repercussa infirmitate redditus solitis non mecum ferebam nisi amantem memoriam et quasi olefacta desiderantem, quae comedere nondum possem.⁴⁷

or this passage from Book VI (i.1) on despair as the innermost substance of all these things for the 'ch'io perdei la speranza de l'altezza' of I.54:

Et ambulabam per tenebras et lubricum et quaerebam te foris a me et non inveniebam Deum cordis mei; et veneram in profundum maris et diffidebam et desperabam de inventione veri.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ For what I would say, Lord, is that I do not know how I came into this dying life, or, should I say, living death?

⁴⁵ In fact I bore the burden of the world as contentedly as someone bears a heavy load of sleep. My thoughts, as I meditated on you, were like the efforts of a man who tries to wake but cannot and sinks back into the depths of slumber.

⁴⁶ [the leopard ... did so impede my way] that more than once I turned round to go back ... she pushed me back to where the sun is silent.

⁴⁷ I tried to raise my mental perceptions out of the abyss which engulfed them, but I sank into it once more ... But I had no strength to fix my gaze upon them. In my weakness I recoiled and fell back into my old ways, carrying with me nothing but the memory of something that I had loved and longed for, as though I had sensed the fragrance of the fare but was not yet able to eat it.

⁴⁸ Yet I was walking on a treacherous path in darkness. I was looking for you outside myself, and I did not find the God of my own heart. I had reached the depths of the ocean. I had lost all faith and was in despair of finding the truth.

Right from the outset, then, Augustine is there, not so much to authorize the text, as, by way of a kind of formed friendship, to encourage the spirit in a moment of shared intelligence, his, liminally or subliminally, being a presence as decisive as any for the shape and substance of the text in its precise conception and articulation.

But if, in the sense we have described, the *Confessions* remains for Dante a faithful guide to the psychology and pathology of being in its estrangement, there can be no question of his acquiescing in quite the kind of grace theology developed by Augustine in the anti-Pelagian moment of his meditation and decisive in turn for the substance and complexion of Thomas's meditation in the twilight pages of the *Prima secundae*. For if by this we have in mind Augustine's sense of man's being and becoming as a matter of continuous gracing from on high, herein alone lying the solution to his original and continuing disobedience, then Dante's, by contrast, is a sense (*a*) of the moral and ontological co-adequation of human nature by way of God's work in Christ on Calvary, and (*b*), and as freshly confirmed by this, of the co-inherence of divine and human willing at the core itself of existence, at which point the dark substance of late Augustinian spirituality gives way to something more radiant, to a sense of the renewed functionality of the human project in consequence of its closeness to the Father's heart. Taking first, then, the position in Augustine we may begin by noting these lines from the *De gratia et libero arbitrio* at vi.15, settled in their sense of human deserving as but a mode or manifestation of divine deserving, of God's own righteousness:

Sed cum dicunt pelagiani hanc esse solam non secundum merita nostra gratiam, qua homini peccata dimittuntur, illam vero quae datur in fine, id est, aeternam vitam, meritis nostris praecedentibus reddi, respondendum est eis. Si enim merita nostra sic intellegerent, ut etiam ipsa dona Dei esse cognoscerent, non esset reprobanda ista sententia; quoniam vero merita humana sic praedicant, ut ea ex semetipso habere hominem dicant, prorsus rectissime respondet Apostolus: "Quis enim te discernit? Quid autem habes quod non accepisti? Si autem et accepisti, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis?" Prorsus talia cogitanti verissime dicitur: Dona sua coronat Deus, non merita tua, si tibi a te ipso, non ab illo sunt merita tua. Haec enim si talia sunt, mala sunt; quae non coronat Deus: si autem bona sunt, Dei dona sunt: quia, sicut dicit apostolus Iacobus: "Omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum desursum est, descendens a Patre luminum". Unde dicit et Ioannes praecursor Domini: "Non potest homo accipere quidquam, nisi fuerit ei datum de caelo" – utique de caelo, unde etiam venit Spiritus Sanctus, quando Iesus ascendit in altum, captivavit captivitatem, dedit dona hominibus. Si

ergo Dei dona sunt bona merita tua, non Deus coronat merita tua tamquam merita tua, sed tamquam dona sua.⁴⁹

or, as bearing on man's inability, not only to do well, but to do at all, these from the *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum* at II.viii.18, uncompromising in their statement of this as the leading idea:

Hoc enim nobis obiciendum putarunt, quod invito et reluctanti homini Deum dicamus inspirare, non quanticumque boni, sed et ipsius imperfecti cupiditatem. Fortassis ergo ipsi eo modo saltem servant locum gratiae, ut sine illa putent hominem posse habere boni, sed imperfecti cupiditatem, perfecti autem non facilius per illam posse, sed nisi per illam omnino non posse. Verum et sic gratiam Dei dicunt secundum merita nostra dari ... Si enim sine Dei gratia per nos incipit cupiditas boni; ipsum coeptum erit meritum, cui tamquam ex debito gratiae veniat adiutorium ac sic gratia Dei non gratis donabitur, sed secundum meritum nostrum dabitur. Dominus autem, ut responderet futuro Pelagio, non ait: "Sine me difficile potestis aliquid facere", sed ait: "Sine me nihil potestis facere". Et ut responderet futuris etiam istis in eadem ipsa evangelica sententia, non ait: "Sine me nihil potestis *perficere*", sed *facere*. Nam si "*perficere*" dixisset, possent isti dicere non ad incipiendum bonum, quod a nobis est, sed ad perficiendum esse Dei adiutorium necessarium. Verum audiant et Apostolum. Dominus enim cum ait: "Sine me nihil potestis facere", hoc uno verbo initium finemque comprehendit.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ When, however, the Pelagians say that the only grace which is not awarded according to our merits is that whereby a man has his sins forgiven him, but that the final grace which is bestowed upon us, even eternal life, is given in return for preceding merits, they must not be allowed to go without an answer. If, indeed, they understand our merits in such a sense as to acknowledge even them to be the gifts of God, then their opinion would not deserve reprobation. But inasmuch as they preach up human merits to such an extent as to declare that a man has them of his own self, then the apostle's reply becomes an absolutely correct one: 'Who makes you to differ from one another? And what have you that you have not received? Now if you did receive it, why do you glory as if you had not received it?' [1 Cor. 4:7] To a man who holds such views, it is perfect truth to say that it is his own gifts that God crowns, not your merits, although you hold these as done by your own self, not by him. If, indeed, they are of such a character, they are evil, and God does not crown them; but if they are good, they are God's gifts, because, as the Apostle James says, 'Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and comes down from the Father of lights' [James 1:17]. In accordance with which John also, the Lord's forerunner, declares: 'A man can receive nothing except it be given him from heaven' [John 3:27] – from heaven, of course, for from thence came also the Holy Spirit, when Jesus ascended up on high, led captivity captive, and gave gifts to men. Inasmuch, then, as your merits are God's gifts, God does not crown your merits as such, but only as his own gifts.

⁵⁰ For they have thought that it was to be objected to us that we say that God infuses into man, unwilling and resisting, the desire, not of good, how great soever it be, but

All the main ingredients of Augustine's mature theology of grace are here, from the impressive array of proof-texts (John 3:27; 15:5; 1 Corinthians 4:7; James 1:17) through to the conclusion (a) that in acknowledging what man does for God, God is merely acknowledging what he himself does for man; (b) that man as man is properly speaking powerless to do well, for he has nothing which he has not received from another; and (c) that every kind of authentic movement of desiring and doing in man begins with God himself as its author and sustainer. Now to this, as the substance of Augustinian grace-theological wisdom as conveyed by Thomas in the mature phase of his meditation, Dante brings an alternative model, a sense (a) of man's having been created in a state of moral and ontological freedom (his leading intuition in the area of creation theology); (b) of his having been confirmed in that freedom by the work of Christ on the cross (his leading intuition in the area of atonement theology); and (c) of God's abiding with him in the recesses of personality, shaping and substantiating as he does so – but *with* man as distinct from *over against* him – in the critical moment of seeing, understanding and choosing (his leading intuition in the area of grace theology). First, then, as bearing on the original *let it be* in the freedom of that being, these lines (67-78) from *Paradiso* VII, consummate in their sense of freedom thus understood as the freedom fully and unambiguously *to be*, as the mark in man of his Godlikeness:

Ciò che da lei senza mezzo distilla
non ha poi fine, perché non si move
la sua impronta quand' ella sigilla.
Ciò che da essa senza mezzo piove
libero è tutto, perché non soggiace
a la virtute de le cose nove.

even of imperfect good. Possibly, then, they themselves are keeping open a place at least for grace, as thinking that man may have the desire of good without grace, but only of imperfect good; while in respect of the perfect good, it is not that he could enjoy such good more easily with grace, but that, short of grace, he could not enjoy it at all. Truly, they are saying here yet again that God's grace is given according to our merits ... for if without God's grace the desire of good begins with ourselves, merit itself will have begun with us, to which, as if by way of obligation, comes the assistance of grace; and thus God's grace will not be bestowed freely, but will be given according to our merit. But that he might furnish a reply to the future Pelagius, the Lord does not say 'Without me you can do anything only with difficulty' [John 15:5], but he says 'Without me you can do nothing'. And, that he might also furnish an answer to these future heretics, in that very same evangelical saying he does not say 'Without me you can *perfect* nothing', but '*do* nothing'. For if he had said 'perfect', they might say that God's aid is necessary, not for beginning good, which is of ourselves, but for perfecting it. But let us hear the apostle. For when the Lord says 'Without me you can do nothing', in this one word he comprehends both the beginning and the ending.

Più l'è conforme, e però più le piace;
ché l'ardor santo ch'ogne cosa raggia,
ne la più somigliante è più vivace.
Di tutte queste dote s'avvantaggia
l'umana creatura, e s'una manca,
di sua nobilità convien che caggia.⁵¹

– lines to which, as similarly secure in their sense of man's freedom for manoeuvre as the substance of his humanity, we should add these from *Purgatorio* XVI:

Lo cielo i vostri movimenti inizia;
non dico tutti, ma, posto ch'ì 'l dica,
lume v'è dato a bene e a malizia,
e libero voler; che, se fatica
ne le prime battaglie col ciel dura,
poi vince tutto, se ben si notrica.
A maggior forza e a miglior natura
liberi soggiacetete; e quella cria
la mente in voi, che 'l ciel non ha in sua cura.

(*Purg.* XVI.73-81)⁵²

and, as bearing on free will as, of all God's gifts to man, the one he most delights in, these from *Paradiso* V:

Lo maggior don che Dio per sua larghezza
fesse creando, e a la sua bontate
più conformato, e quel ch'è più apprezza,
fu de la volontà la libertate;
di che le creature intelligenti,
e tutte e sole, fuoro e son dotate.
Or ti parrà, se tu quinci argomenti,
l'alto valor del voto, s'è sì fatto

⁵¹ That which immediately derives from it thereafter has no end, because when it seals, its imprint may never be removed. That which rains down from it immediately is wholly free, because it is not subject to the power of new things. It is the most conformed to it and therefore pleases it the most; for the holy ardour, which irradiates everything, is most living in what is most like itself. With all these gifts the human creature is advantaged, and if one fails, it needs must fall from its nobility.

⁵² The heavens initiate your movements – I do not say all of them, but given for the moment that that is what I am saying, a light is given you to know good and evil, and free will, which if it endure fatigue in its first battles with the heavens, afterwards, if it is well nurtured, it conquers completely. You lie subject, in your freedom, to a greater power and to a better nature, and that creates the mind in you which the heavens have not in their charge.

che Dio consenta quando tu consenti;
ché, nel fermar tra Dio e l'omo il patto,
vittima fassi di questo tesoro,
tal quale io dico; e fassi col suo atto.

(Par. V.19-30)⁵³

But that is not all, for the freedom proper to man in the moment of his creation is the freedom confirmed afresh by God through his work in Christ on the cross, a work designed in response to the catastrophe of Eden to enable him to participate in his own resurrection. This, then, is his point of arrival in *Paradiso* VII as the atonement canto *par excellence* of the *Commedia*, a canto which, alert to the judicial moment of the Christ event, to the notion of a price to be paid in the wake of Eden, settles even so on a sense of God's wishing to involve man in his own making good. Straightaway, then, the object pronoun (the 'rilevarvi' of line 111) gives way to the reflexive pronoun (the 'rilevarvi' of line 116) as testimony to the completeness and courage of Dante's meditation at this point, his fashioning from the content of atonement theology in its classical form an essay in spiritual re-potentialization:

⁵³ The greatest gift which God in his bounty bestowed in creating, and the most conformed to his own goodness and that which he most prizes, was the freedom of the will, with which the creatures who have intelligence, they all and they alone, were and are endowed. Now, if you argue from this, the high worth of the vow will appear to you, if it be such that God consents when you consent; for in establishing the compact between God and man, this treasure becomes the sacrifice, such as I pronounce it, and that by its own act. C. J. Ryan, 'Free Will in Theory and Practice: *Purgatorio* XVIII and Two Characters in the *Inferno*', in D. Nolan (ed.), *Dante Soundings* (Dublin and Totowa, NJ: Irish Academic Press, 1981), pp. 100-12 (see too, idem, 'Man's Free Will in the Works of Siger of Brabant', *Medieval Studies* 45 (1983), 155-99); S. Harwood-Gordon, *A Study of the Theology and Imagery of Dante's 'Divina Commedia'*. *Sensory Perception, Reason and Free Will* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1991); A. Bufano, 'Applicazione della dottrina del libero arbitrio nella *Commedia*', in A. Paoletta et al. (eds), 2 vols, *Miscellanea di studi danteschi in memoria di Silvio Pasquazi* (Naples: Federico & Ardia, 1993), vol. 1, pp. 193-99; C. Fordyce, 'Il problema di amore e libero arbitrio nella *Commedia* di Dante', *Romance Review* 4 (1994), 1, 35-51; E. G. Miller, 'Free will', in *Sense Perception in Dante's Commedia* (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1996), pp. 189-230; M. Roddewig, '*Purgatorio* XVI: Zorn und Willensfreiheit', *Deutsches Dante-Jahrbuch* 74 (1999), 123-35; E. N. Girardi, 'Al centro del *Purgatorio*: il tema del libero arbitrio', in A. Ghisalberti (ed.), *Il pensiero filosofico e teologico di Dante Alighieri* (Milan: V&P Università, 2001), pp. 21-38; P. Falzone, 'Psicologia dell'atto umano in Dante', in N. Bray and L. Sturlese (eds), *Filosofia in volgare nel Medioevo. Atti del Convegno della Società Italiana per lo Studio del Pensiero Medievale, Lecce, 27-29 settembre 2002* (Louvain-La-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales, 2003), pp. 331-66; F. Silvestrini, 'Libero arbitrio e libertà nella *Divina Commedia*', in G. Carletti (ed.), *Prima di Machiavelli. Itinerari e linguaggi della politica tra il XIV e il XVI secolo. Atti del Convegno di Teramo, 29-30 aprile 2004* (Pescara: Edizioni Scientifiche Abruzzesi, 2007), pp. 73-86; M. Sità, 'Il problema del libero arbitrio nella *Divina Commedia*', in *Dante Füzetek. A Magyar Dantisztikai Társaság Folyóirata* 2 (2007), 2, 43-51.

Ma perché l'ovra tanto è più gradita
 da l'operante, quanto più appresenta
 de la bontà del core ond' ell' è uscita,
 la divina bontà che 'l mondo imprenta,
 di proceder per tutte le sue vie,
 a rilevarvi suso, fu contenta.
 Né tra l'ultima notte e 'l primo die
 sì alto o sì magnifico processo,
 o per l'una o per l'altra, fu o fie:
 ché più largo fu Dio a dar sé stesso
 per far l'uom sufficiente a rilevarsi,
 che s'elli avesse sol da sé dimesso;
 e tutti li altri modi erano scarsi
 a la giustizia, se 'l Figliuol di Dio
 non fosse umiliato ad incarnarsi.

(*Par.* VII.106-20)⁵⁴

And it is this sense of God's work in Christ as a matter of his entering into the human situation there to quicken it afresh in respect of its power to make a difference which determines in Dante's mind the precise nature of his presence to man in the moment of deciding and doing, in the depths of the ontic instant; for it is a question now, not of referring that deciding and doing to the divine initiative as the ground and guarantee of their efficacy, but of an 'inwilling' of the human by the divine, where by 'inwilling' we mean, not repossessing or dispossessing, but – somewhat after the manner of the hypostatic idea itself – indwelling, abiding with, making its home with:

Frate, la nostra volontà quieta
 virtù di carità, che fa volerne
 sol quel ch'avemo, e d'altro non ci asseta.
 Se dissiassimo esser più superne,
 foran discordi li nostri disiri
 dal voler di colui che qui ne cerne;
 che vedrai non capere in questi giri,

⁵⁴ But because the deed is so much the more prized by the doer, the more it displays of the goodness of the heart whence it issued, the divine goodness, which puts its imprint on the world, was pleased to proceed by all its ways to raise you up again; nor between the last night and the first day has there been or will there be so exalted and so magnificent a procedure, either by one or the other; for God was more bounteous in giving himself to make man sufficient to uplift himself again, than if he solely of himself had remitted; and all other modes were scanty in respect to justice, if the Son of God had not humbled himself to become incarnate.

s'essere in carità è qui *necessse*,
 e se la sua natura ben rimiri.
 Anzi è formale ad esto beato *esse*
 tenersi dentro a la divina voglia,
 per ch'una fansi nostre voglie stesse;
 sì che, come noi sem di soglia in soglia
 per questo regno, a tutto il regno piace
 com' a lo re che 'n suo voler ne 'nvoglia.
 E 'n la sua volontade è nostra pace:
 ell' è quel mare al qual tutto si move
 ciò ch'ella crïa o che natura face.

(*Par.* III.70-87)⁵⁵

God, in other words, far from merely looking on where the exiguousness of the human situation is concerned and operating at a remove from that situation, does what God always does in these circumstances, which is to enter into it there to resolve it from within, by way of what already *is* in consequence of the primordial *let it be*. It is in this sense, then, that, for all the presence of the great bishop to him in point both of world-historical and of self-interpretation in all the dire substance of these things, Dante feels able to delight in the viability of the human project. For all the presence of the great bishop to him in both these senses, there can be no question either of confusing them or, as far as Dante is concerned, of underestimating the completeness of his rethinking of the theological issue; for taking seriously as he does the incarnational idea as the basis for any genuine expression of the Christian mind, his, inevitably, was a rethinking of Augustinian positions in the area of grace theology, a recalibration of antique emphases in favour of a fresh act of rejoicing.

4. To live with Augustine is always to live with the complexity of Augustine, with his tremendous power both to detain and to deter the spirit in one and the same instant, and this, certainly, was Dante's experience of him, his too being a resting in the congeniality of the text and a flight from its leading contentions. On the one hand, then, there was his shared commitment to

⁵⁵ Brother, the power of love quiets our will and makes us wish only for that which we have and gives us no other thirst. Did we desire to be more aloft, our longings would be discordant with his will who assigns us here, which you will see is not possible in these circles if to exist in charity here is of necessity, and if you well consider what is love's nature. Indeed, it is of the essence of this blessed existence to keep itself within the divine will, whereby our wills are made one; so that our being thus from threshold to threshold throughout this realm is a joy to all the realm as to the king, who inwills us with his will; and in his will is our peace. It is that sea to which all moves, both what it creates and what nature makes.

the notion of the Godhead as apt to comprehend every kind of temporal and spatial determination,⁵⁶ of paradise as a coming home of the spirit to the perfect peace of the One who *is* as of the essence,⁵⁷ of the universe as no more than the sum total of its love-impulses and of love itself as a matter of spiritual gravitation,⁵⁸ of the rational soul in man as a matter of God's inspiration or in-breathing of the body,⁵⁹ of language as a system of signs,⁶⁰ and of Peripateticism as a high point in the history of philosophy;⁶¹ while on the other there was his misgiving relative to Augustine on, for example, Rome and the iniquity thereof and on the stench of paganism

⁵⁶ *De civ. Dei*. VII.xxx: 'Haec autem facit atque agit unus verus Deus, sed sicut Deus, id est ubique totus, nullis inclusus locis, nullis vinculis alligatus, in nullas partes sectilis, ex nulla parte mutabilis, implens caelum et terram praesente potentia, non indigente natura', etc., for the 'fuor d'ogne altro comprender' moment of *Par.* XXIX.17 (cf. *Conv.* II.iii.11: 'Questo è lo soprano edificio del mondo, nel quale tutto lo mondo s'inchiude, e di fuori dal quale nulla è; ed esso non è in luogo ma formato fu solo ne la prima Mente, la quale li Greci dicono Protonoè').

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* XIX.xvii: 'Utitur ergo etiam caelestis civitas in hac sua peregrinatione pace terrena et de rebus ad mortalem hominum naturam pertinentibus humanarum voluntatum compositionem, quantum salva pietate ac religione conceditur, tuetur atque appetit eamque terrenam pacem refert ad caelestem pacem, quae vere ita pax est, ut rationalis dumtaxat creaturae sola pax habenda atque dicenda sit, ordinatissima scilicet et concordissima societas fruendi Deo et invicem in Deo.'

⁵⁸ The 'corpus pondere suo nititur ad locum suum' moment of the *Confessions* at XIII. ix.10 (note 34 above).

⁵⁹ *De civ. Dei*. XIII.xxiv.4: 'In hominis autem conditione obliviscimur, quemadmodum loqui Scriptura consueverit, cum suo prorsus more locuta sit, quo insinuaret hominem etiam rationali anima accepta, quam non sicut aliarum carniū aquis et terra producentibus, sed Deo flante creatam voluit intellegi ...', for the 'spira / spirito novo' sequence of *Purg.* XXV (ll. 61-75).

⁶⁰ *De doct. christ.* I.ii.2 and vi.6: 'Nemo enim utitur verbis nisi aliquid significandi gratia. Ex quo intellegitur quid appellem signa: res eas videlicet quae ad significandum aliquid adhibentur ... Et tamen Deus, cum de illo nihil digne dici possit, admisit humanae vocis obsequium, et verbis nostris in laude sua gaudere nos voluit. Nam inde est et quod dicitur Deus', for the 'aliquid rationale signum et sensuale' and the 'consequens est quod primus loquens primo et ante omnia dixisset "Deus"' moments of *DVE* I.iii.2 and I.iv.4 respectively.

⁶¹ *De civ. Dei*. VIII.xii: 'cum Aristoteles Platonis discipulus, vir excellentis ingenii et eloquio Platoni quidem impar, sed multos facile superans, cum sectam Peripateticam condidisset, quod deambulans disputare consueverat, plurimosque discipulos praeclara fama excellens vivo adhuc praeceptore in suam haeresim congregasset ...', for the 'e massimamente Aristotele' moment of *Conv.* IV.vi.15-16 (with its 'che tanto vale quanto "deambulatori"' at 15 ult.). E. Moore, *Studies in Dante* (note 25 above), p. 294, notes the repeated sensation of familiarity in turning the pages of the text: 'I must confess, in conclusion, that I have not been able as yet to investigate the question of Dante's probable acquaintance with the works of St Augustine nearly as fully as the subject seems to deserve. I am continually coming on fresh points of resemblance.'

generally. But – and this now is the point – Dante’s difficulty with Augustine, conspicuous as it is at the level of itemized intentionality, of this or that discrete inflexion of the spirit, reaches all the way down into the depths, into the unitemized because unitemizable substance of what fundamentally he, *vis-à-vis* Augustine, actually was and is; for his, over against Augustine’s, was and is a commitment, less to the dereliction of the human project in consequence of Eden and of the Eden which lives on in the recalcitrant spirit of every man, but to the grace and beauty of that project as confirmed in the moment both of its original articulation and of its fresh affirmation in Christ and Christ’s work on the cross. The agony of it all – meaning by this the hopelessness everywhere engendered by man’s seeing the best but clinging to the worst – is there as a dominant structure of consciousness in each alike, and this indeed is where Dante comes closest to Augustine as the great genius of the religious life in our tradition. But there is in Dante more besides; for his, amid that agony but in a manner apt ultimately to transcend it, is a sense of the human project as forever indwelt by grace, as forever refreshed by grace, and, in direct consequence of these things, as forever invited to participate at first hand in its own resurrection.